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(18) 
ESSAY 
RECONSIDERING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE:  
FORTY-FIVE YEARS IN THE TRENCHES  
AND IN THE TOWER 
STEPHEN B. BURBANK† 
Judicial independence is in the air—again. Although I had not worked on 
or written about that subject directly since 2007,1 I have participated in, or 
will participate in, four programs about judicial independence within one 
year. Thinking about the topic for these events has caused me to realize that 
issues concerning judicial independence have been an important part of my 
life as a lawyer, scholar, and engaged citizen since the beginning of my career 
more than forty years ago. Indeed, had I harbored any doubt about the 
reasons for the recent resurgence of interest in judicial independence, 
revisiting my own experience would have resolved it. 
Trusting in the integrity of our institutions when they are not under 
stress, we focus attention on them when they are under stress or when we 
need them to protect us against other institutions. In the case of the federal 
judiciary, the two conditions often coincide. In this Essay, I aim to provide 
practical context for some of the important lessons to be learned from the 
periods of stress for the federal judiciary that I have observed as a lawyer 
 
   † David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
This essay is a revised and expanded version of the author’s keynote address at the Stanford Law Review’s 
2019 symposium: “The Independence of the American Judicial System: Politics and Separation of Powers.” 
1 I participated in “Fair and Independent Courts: A Conference on the State of the 
Judiciary” at the Georgetown Law School in 2006. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial 
Independence, Judicial Accountability, and Interbranch Relations, 95 GEO. L.J. 909 (2007) (arguing 
that the main cause of strained relations between the judiciary and the political branches is the 
use of strategies intended to persuade the public that judges are and should be policy agents). As 
is evident from the latter half of this Essay, however, insights developed while working on the 
subject directly have informed my scholarship on other issues.  
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and concerned citizen and to provide theoretical context for lessons I have 
deemed significant as a scholar. 
I start with my personal experience of Watergate, which gave both 
immediacy and abiding significance to the principle that no person is above 
the law, affecting my attitudes towards and participation in other cases, 
including cases pending today, where that principle has been put to the test. 
I then trace lessons learned after writing rules to govern federal judicial 
conduct and disability proceedings and serving on a national commission 
investigating impeachment of federal judges and its alternatives. By far the 
most important of those lessons is the central role that judicial accountability 
plays in enabling judicial independence. 
In the latter half of the Essay, I explore some of the theoretical 
implications that, with the help of interdisciplinary research, I derived from 
these experiences and from defending judges against attacks by politicians 
and interest groups. It shows that over the last decade or so, my work on and 
writing about judicial independence and accountability informed my 
scholarship on matters as disparate as theories of judicial behavior, term limits 
for Supreme Court justices, and the role of the Supreme Court in retrenching 
private enforcement of federal law. 
**** 
I had the privilege of clerking for Chief Justice Warren Burger during the 
October Term 1974. On my first day of work in July of that year, I spent the 
morning filling out forms. Having had lunch in the Court’s cafeteria, I 
returned to my office. Shortly thereafter, a messenger arrived with a large 
envelope, which he gave to me, saying that the Chief Justice had asked me to 
proofread the enclosed opinion. It was, of course, United States v. Nixon,2 the 
Court’s decision requiring compliance with a subpoena for tape-recorded 
conversations in the Oval Office, which precipitated President Nixon’s 
resignation and the end to a “long national nightmare.”3 
For many of my generation, Watergate was woven into the fabric of our 
legal and civic education. For some, the experience was more personal than 
for others. Archibald Cox, the Watergate Special Prosecutor and primary 
 
2 418 U.S. 683 (1974). I had forgotten how quickly after the Court’s decision President Nixon 
resigned (only 16 days later, the day after a national address on August 8). 
3 This was Gerald Ford’s characterization in remarks upon taking the oath of office  
on August 9, 1974: “My fellow Americans, our long national nightmare is over.”  
Gerald R. Ford, Remarks Upon Taking the Oath of Office as President (Aug. 9, 1974), 
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/speeches/740001.asp [https://perma.cc/R47Q-X2CA].  
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target of what became known as the Saturday Night Massacre,4 was my 
teacher and mentor. So also, in different ways, was Chief Justice Burger. 
Because of Watergate, the principle that no person is above the law was 
burned into my consciousness, as also the realization that, there being no 
guarantee that the President would obey the Court’s decision, whether he did 
so might depend on the public’s support for judicial independence. 
Two decades later, this experience of Watergate caused me to do 
something unpopular in certain liberal legal circles, namely, to help write and 
to sign an amicus curiae brief arguing that President Clinton did not enjoy 
immunity against federal civil litigation brought by Paula Jones concerning 
alleged misconduct before he assumed office.5 The Court unanimously 
sustained that position in Clinton v. Jones.6 And two decades after that, it has 
caused me to join with two other professors who signed the brief in Clinton 
v. Jones in amicus curiae briefs arguing that President Trump does not enjoy 
immunity from state court civil litigation concerning his alleged misconduct 
before assuming office.7 Although these briefs have elicited quite a different 
reaction from liberals, it has been my pleasure to demonstrate that the 
principle that no person is above the law is non-partisan.8 
**** 
Just as the experience of Watergate shaped my understanding of the 
central role that judicial independence and separation of powers play in the 
preservation of our democratic way of life, so also did personal experience 
and the scholarly paths it opened up shape my understanding of the central 
role that judicial accountability plays in enabling judicial independence. 
 
4 This became the name for the events of Saturday, October 20, 1973, when President Nixon 
ordered Elliott Richardson, the Attorney General, and then William Ruckelshaus, the Deputy Attorney 
General, to fire Cox, and both refused and resigned; the third person receiving that order, Robert Bork, 
who was Solicitor General, complied and fired Cox. Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Forces Firing of Cox: 
Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit, WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 1973), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/national/longterm/watergate/articles/102173-2.htm [https://perma.cc/2G7B-WZ3X]. 
5 See generally Brief Amicus Curiae of Law Professors in Support of Respondent, Clinton v. 
Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (No. 95-1853), 1996 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 572. Many of the signatories 
of an amicus brief filed in support of President Clinton were part of those “liberal legal circles.” See 
generally Brief Amicus Curiae of Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 
681 (1997) (No. 95-1853), 1996 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 501. 
6 520 U.S. 681 (1997). Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment. Id. at 710 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
7 See generally Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae, Zervos v. Trump, 74 N.Y.S.3d 442 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2018); Brief of Amici Law Professors, People v. Trump, 88 N.Y.S.3d 830 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018). 
8 “The principle for which Clinton v. Jones stands is bipartisan and deserves disinterested 
champions.” Stephen B. Burbank, Richard D. Parker & Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The President is Not Above 
the Law, POLITICO (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/10/18/president-
above-the-law-trump-clinton-221579 [https://perma.cc/Z9S7-DZ7K]. 
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When I was in my second year as a full-time faculty member at Penn Law, 
the Chief Judge of the Third Circuit asked me to serve as co-reporter for a 
committee of judges charged to write the rules of that circuit implementing the 
Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980.9 The 
product of a long legislative process that included the kind of thoughtful 
discussion and debate about issues of institutional prerogative and constitutional 
law that are sadly missing from contemporary congressional deliberations, this 
statute established a process and some rules for filing complaints alleging 
misconduct or disability against Article III judges other than Supreme Court 
justices.10 What could I do other than cheerfully accept the invitation?  
The work required, or so I believed, a deep dive into the history of the 
1980 legislation, which ended up including unfettered access to the files of 
the Director of Legislative Affairs for the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts. That individual was concerned—not without reason—that 
failure of the circuits to take seriously their responsibilities under the Act 
might lead Congress to replace the model of decentralized administrative 
handling of complaints that emerged from that long legislative process; most 
likely to take its place was a centralized model, like that used in many states, 
that some influential senators favored.11 The experience of hammering out 
the compromises underlying the 1980 Act had persuaded him that, however 
apt such a central commission model might be for states, many of whose 
judges are elected, it likely would portend a degree of judicial accountability 
that was inimical to the historic role of federal courts and federal judges. I 
came to believe that he was right. 
My work on the Third Circuit’s rules led to requests to consult for 
committees of the Judicial Conference,12 where, having become a champion of 
 
9 Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–364 (2012)). 
My co-reporter was Daniel Segal, Esq. 
10 See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking Under the Judicial Councils 
Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 283, 283-88, 291-300 
(1982) (describing the history of the Act). 
11 See id. at 291-94 (discussing bills that included a central commission). 
12 These requests were undoubtedly precipitated by the general tenor of my article on 
rulemaking under the 1980 Act, which is captured in the observation that the “alternative to 
central judicial leadership may be further action by Congress.” See id. at 347. That leadership 
first manifested in the non-binding Illustrative Rules, which were prepared in 1986 and 
subsequently revised and amended. Following the 2006 report of the Judicial Conduct and 
Disability Act Study Committee (the so-called “Breyer Committee”), the Judicial Conference 
finally promulgated binding rules in 2008, which were amended in 2015 and again on March 12, 
2019. For the history and current rules, see 2 Guide to Judiciary Policy, pt. E, ch. 3 (2019), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/judicial_conduct_and_disability_rules_effective_ma
rch_12_2019_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/HWN5-CQLW]. See also Editorial, More Progress (and 
Politics) in Federal Judicial Accountability, 91 JUDICATURE 268, 268-69 (2008) (discussing new 
rules, made mandatory by the Judicial Conference, incorporating many recommendations of the 
Breyer Committee); Editorial, Politics and Progress in Federal Judicial Accountability, 90 
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judicial accountability as the judiciary’s friend, I was regarded by some as the 
bearer of bad news. Moreover, those experiences and the scholarship they 
enabled put me in a position to contribute, as a scholar and public citizen, to 
the reconsideration of judicial impeachment,13 a topic that roiled the Senate in 
the mid-1980s, prompting calls for either legislation or a constitutional 
amendment that would ease the burdens of the legislative branch when 
confronted by judges who refused to resign notwithstanding felony convictions 
or other powerful evidence of misbehavior. Believing that such calls were at 
best premature and at worst misguided, I published an article calling for the 
creation of a national commission to reconsider impeachment and its 
alternatives.14 To my surprise, Congress established such a commission,15 and 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives appointed me as a member.16 
The National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal pursued 
an ambitious multi-method research program and in 1993 issued its report, of 
which I had the privilege to be a principal author.17 Rejecting arguments that 
removal could constitutionally be effected other than through the 
impeachment process,18 as well as uninformed criticism of experience under 
the 1980 Act,19 the Commission made detailed recommendations to each 
branch of government. An overarching goal of these recommendations was to 
facilitate responses to problems of judicial misconduct and disability that did 
 
JUDICATURE 52, 53, 92 (2006) (discussing the report of the Breyer Committee). The author was 
chair of the Editorial Committee of the American Judicature Society for many years and drafted 
these editorials. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. 
13 See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution: An Essay on the Removal of 
Federal Judges, 76 KY. L.J. 643, 643-50 (1988). 
14 See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Is it Time for a National Commission on Judicial Independence and 
Accountability?, 73 JUDICATURE 176 (1990). The idea originated with Senator Dole and, after languishing 
in the Senate, was picked up by Representative Kastenmeier. See Burbank, supra note 13, at 699-700. 
15 Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5124 (1990). 
16 See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL 
(1993) (“Members of the Commission”). 
17 See id. at iii-v (describing the creation of the Commission and the Commission’s 
methodology, which included comprehensive academic research, public hearings, and roundtable 
discussions). For a more detailed discussion of the Commission’s work, see generally Stephen B. 
Burbank & S. Jay Plager, Foreword: The Law of Federal Judicial Discipline and the Lessons of Social 
Science, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1993). 
18 REPORT, supra note 16, at 17-20. 
19 Id. at 83-127. The Commission concluded its chapter on the judicial branch, of which I was 
the principal author, as follows: 
Unjustified suspicion of the ethics and conduct of federal judges or of the federal 
judiciary’s commitment to effective self-regulation is harmful to the rule of law and a 
threat to judicial independence. The judiciary thus has a direct institutional interest 
in a system of self-regulation that is not only effective but perceived to be effective. 
Id. at 127. 
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not, in the name of efficiency or from failure to see the forest for the trees, 
unduly disrupt institutional compromises forged over two centuries.20 
**** 
All of these experiences proved important when, in the late 1990s, I 
undertook deeper scholarly engagement with the concept of judicial 
independence. Alas, again, one of these efforts was greeted as bad news, to wit, 
my contribution to a festschrift celebrating Judge Jack Weinstein’s thirtieth 
year on the federal bench. In that article, I argued that central to Weinstein’s 
self-image as a federal judge were conceptions of independence and 
accountability that he brought with him from his time as a tenured faculty 
member at Columbia Law School—conceptions that, I maintained, were 
inconsistent with his responsibilities as a lower court judge and as part of the 
judiciary as an institution.21 In fairness, I did try to turn down this invitation, 
but I was persuaded not to do so by the organizer of the symposium and the 
judge himself, neither of whom apparently could believe that, upon sober 
reflection, my stated misgivings would not be overcome by appreciation of the 
judge’s brilliance and imagination (qualities that I celebrated in my article). 
“Deeper scholarly engagement with the concept of judicial independence” 
included systematic reading in the literatures of other disciplines, notably 
political science. As a result, I concluded that discussions and debates about 
judicial independence had produced more heat than light and that scholars 
in different disciplines had been talking past one another.22 A few years 
 
20 See id. at 147-55 (listing conclusions and recommendations). 
21 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom: Independence, Imagination and Ideology in 
the Work of Jack Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1971, 1982-93 (1997) (“In matters pertaining to judicial 
accountability, Judge Weinstein is a strict constructionist, parsing statutes and denying claims of 
inherent power of appellate courts in a fashion and with an attitude quite different from that which 
characterizes his own exercises of power.”). This article prompted Professor Neuborne, for whom it 
was bad news, to write a reply. See Burt Neuborne, Innovation in the Interstices of the Final Judgment Rule: 
A Demurrer to Professor Burbank, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2091, 2091 (1997) (“[T]he federal ‘final judgment’ 
system, which places strict limits on interlocutory appeals, requires and encourages trial judge 
innovation as a means of balancing the just, the good, and the formal elements of law.”). 
22 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315, 326-
30 (1999) [hereinafter Architecture] (discussing theoretical approaches to defining and understanding 
judicial independence). Indeed, the same was true of scholars within the same discipline:  
Imagine my surprise when, having learned from one group of political scientists that Supreme 
Court justices are accountable to elected politicians and thus that judicial independence is a 
myth, I learned from another group of political scientists that Supreme Court justices are 
wholly independent, and thus that judicial accountability is a myth. 
Stephen B. Burbank, On the Study of Judicial Behaviors: Of Law, Politics, Science and Humility, in WHAT’S 
LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE 41, 46-
47 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011) [hereinafter On the Study of Judicial Behaviors] (citations omitted).  
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later, Barry Friedman and I convened a conference of some thirty 
prominent academics with backgrounds spanning the disciplines of law, 
economics, history, and political science to discuss what we knew about 
judicial independence. In a chapter of the book that emerged from the 
conference, 23 and in a free-standing article,24 I sought to demonstrate that 
judicial independence is the other side of the coin from judicial 
accountability; that neither is an end in itself but rather a means to an end 
(or variety of ends); that the relevant ends relate not primarily to individual 
judicial performance but rather to the performance of courts and court 
systems; and that there is no one ideal mix of independence and 
accountability, but rather that the right mix depends upon the goals of  
those responsible for institutional architecture with respect to  
a particular court or court system. 
The U.S. Constitution does not refer to “judicial independence,” which is 
itself evidence of a proposition essential to proper understanding of the term, 
namely that judicial independence is a means to an end, not an end in itself.25 
Put otherwise, in its positive dimensions, judicial independence is not an 
operative legal concept but rather a way of describing the consequences of legal 
arrangements. In the case of federal judges, the pertinent legal arrangements 
are the Constitution’s provisions for life tenure and secure compensation. Yet, 
scholarship has made it plain that these formal protections of federal judicial 
independence pale in comparison with formal powers that might be deployed 
to control federal courts. Rather, as the work of Charles Geyh in particular 
demonstrates,26 the traditional equilibrium between the federal judiciary and 
the other branches owes its existence to informal norms and customs, such as 
that against using the impeachment process in response to judicial decisions27 
 
23 Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, Reconsidering Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 9 (Stephen B. 
Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002). 
24 Stephen B. Burbank, What Do We Mean by “Judicial Independence”?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 323 (2003) 
[hereinafter What Do We Mean?]; see also Burbank, Architecture, supra note 22, at 318-26, 339-49 
(describing approaches to judicial independence, including the idea that judicial independence and 
judicial accountability are two sides of the same coin); Stephen B. Burbank, The Past and Present of Judicial 
Independence, 80 JUDICATURE 117, 117-18 (1996) (“It should be impossible, except perhaps for a lawyer, to 
think about [judicial independence] without thinking about [judicial accountability].”). 
25 “Attention to the core of judicial independence can obscure the view that, apart from 
enabling judicial review, it is instrumental to the resolution of ordinary cases according to law.” 
Burbank, Architecture, supra note 22, at 336. 
26 See id. at 321-26 (describing the norm against the political branches using tools like 
impeachment, jurisdiction-stripping, and court-packing to control the judicial branch). See generally 
CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2006) (exploring the federal judiciary’s relationship 
with Congress and arguing that judicial independence is attributable more to institutional norms 
than to constitutional structure).  
27 GEYH, supra note 26, at 113-70. 
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and that against court-packing as a means of ensuring decisions in accord with 
the preferences of the dominant coalition.28 
Understanding that judicial independence is not an end in itself is perhaps 
easiest if one considers whether any society would seek to establish courts that 
were completely independent, such that they were free to decide cases as they 
saw fit, without any constraint.29 Going down that path enables one quickly to 
grasp another essential proposition, which is that judicial independence and 
judicial accountability are not discrete concepts at war with each other. They 
are complements or, again, different sides of the same coin. An accountable 
judiciary without any independence is weak and feeble. An independent 
judiciary without any accountability is dangerous. In thinking about the level 
of executive, legislative, or popular influence that is compatible with a desired 
level of independence, we are thinking about accountability. 
From these premises one can derive a number of additional propositions.30 
First, judicial accountability has as many roles to play as judicial independence. 
As a result, judicial accountability should serve to moderate what would 
otherwise be unacceptable decisional independence (i.e., decisions unchecked 
by law as generally understood or, in the case of inferior courts, by the prospect 
or reality of appellate review). In addition, judicial accountability should 
moderate other judicial behavior that is hostile to or inconsistent with the 
ability of courts to achieve the role(s) envisioned for them in the particular 
polity (for example, in the words of the 1980 Act, “conduct prejudicial to the 
effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts”31). 
Second, just as independence must be conceived in relation to other actors 
(independence from whom or what?), so must accountability (accountability 
to whom or what?). As a result, judicial accountability should run to the 
public, including litigants whose disputes courts resolve and who, therefore, 
have a legitimate interest in court proceedings that are open to the public and 
in judicial decisions that are accessible. Judicial accountability should also run 
to the people’s representatives, who appropriate the funds for the judiciary 
and whose laws the courts interpret and apply. As a result, they have a 
legitimate interest in ensuring that the judiciary has been responsible in 
spending the allotted funds and that, as interpreted and applied by the courts, 
public laws are functioning as intended. Finally, judicial accountability should 
run to courts and the judiciary as an institution, both because individual judicial 
independence exists primarily for the benefit of institutional independence and 
 
28 Id. at 66-70, 77-91. 
29 “One implication of this proposition is that, from a pre-modern, anthropological 
perspective, we need law to constrain judges rather than judges to serve the rule of law.” Burbank, 
What Do We Mean?, supra note 24, at 326. 
30 See Burbank, supra note 1, at 912-13 (setting out the propositions that follow). 
31 28 U.S.C. § 351 (2012). 
26 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online [Vol. 168: 18 
because appropriate intrabranch accountability is essential if potentially 
inappropriate interbranch accountability is to be avoided. In each instance, 
proper regard for the other side of the coin—that is, for judicial independence—
requires that accountability not entail influence that is deemed to be undue. 
**** 
The first decade of the new millennium found me spending a lot of time 
on judicial independence and accountability quite apart from the theoretical 
writing just described. Again, experience in the trenches helped to shape my 
views in the tower. As chair of the Editorial Committee for the late, 
lamented American Judicature Society in the 2000–2008 period, it largely fell 
to me to craft the Society’s responses in the pages of Judicature to a series of 
attacks on or attempts to control federal (and state) courts and judges.32 
Doing so enabled me to see that those attacks and attempts to control 
reflected a debased notion of judicial accountability implicit in a view of 
judges as policy agents.33 Moreover, with the benefit of the political science 
 
32 See Editorial, An Earthquake in South Dakota?, 89 JUDICATURE 192, 192 (2006) (describing a 
proposed state constitutional amendment that would allow judges defending civil suits arising from 
their judicial acts to be stripped of their immunity or even to face criminal indictment); Editorial, 
Clinton’s Legacy or Bork’s?, 84 JUDICATURE 224, 224 (2001) (criticizing the treatment of all federal 
judicial appointments as if they were Supreme Court appointments or as part of normal politics); 
Editorial, Judges, Ideology, and Accountability, 85 JUDICATURE 212, 212-13 (2002) (“Just as we should 
stop pretending that the policy preferences of potential appointees are or should be irrelevant in the 
selection process, so should we avoid the fallacy of assimilating the politics of federal judicial selection 
to normal politics.”); Editorial, Judicial Accountability, 89 JUDICATURE 4, 4 (2005) (emphasizing that, 
though judicial accountability is important, “heavy-handed programs implemented under the banner 
of ‘accountability’ are the enemy of the kind of independence that we should want in our judges.”); 
Editorial, Judicial Independence at the Crossroads, 85 JUDICATURE 260, 260 (2002) (calling for more 
interdisciplinary research into the structures and incentives that promote judicial independence and 
accountability); Editorial, Listening to Judge Lefkow, 88 JUDICATURE 240, 240 (2005) (calling on 
public officials to refrain from inflammatory rhetoric when discussing the judiciary); Editorial, More 
Progress (and Politics) in Federal Judicial Accountability, supra note 12, at 268 (praising the Rules for 
Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings as a system of self-regulation that promotes 
judicial accountability); Editorial, Politics and Progress in Federal Judicial Accountability, supra note 12, 
at 52-53 (commending three initiatives of the federal judiciary intended to address congressional 
concerns about judicial accountability); Editorial, Separation of Powers and Mutual Respect, 87 
JUDICATURE 200, 200 (2004) (calling on the judicial and legislative branches to avoid inflammatory 
rhetoric about each other); Editorial, The Judicial Independence and Accountability Task Force, 88 
JUDICATURE 108, 108 (2004) (describing the creation and activities of the American Judicature 
Society’s Judicial Independence and Accountability Task Force); Editorial, The War on Courts and 
Other Wars, 90 JUDICATURE 148, 148 (2007) (criticizing jurisdiction-stripping measures that treat 
judges as policy agents of the current political majority); Editorial, Three Branches, Not Two: Congress 
Should Reconsider Recent Assaults on Federal Sentencing Discretion, 86 JUDICATURE 276, 276 (2003) 
(criticizing legislation that limited sentencing discretion). 
33 Editorial, Judicial Accountability, supra note 32, at 4-5; Burbank, supra note 1, at 910; Editorial, 
Politics and Progress in Federal Judicial Accountability, supra note 12, at 52; Editorial, The War on Courts 
and Other Wars, supra note 32, at 148. 
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literatures on public knowledge of and attitudes towards courts as well as on 
the behavior of interest groups, it seemed to me that, if those on the front 
lines of the war on courts succeeded in persuading the public to view judges 
as policy agents and courts as part of ordinary politics, it might be impossible 
to maintain (or return to) the traditional equilibrium. The informal norms 
and customs which enable that equilibrium were forged and sustained in the 
shadow of what political scientists refer to as the public’s diffuse support for 
the courts34—support that persists even in the face of unpopular decisions, 
where so-called specific support is lacking.35 
In light of those literatures, there was reason to fear that the distinction 
between diffuse support and specific support would disappear, with the public 
asking of the judiciary not, “What does the law require?” but rather, “What 
have you done for me lately?”36 In such a system, law itself would be seen as 
nothing more than ordinary politics, and it would become increasingly 
difficult to appoint, elect, or retain people with the qualities necessary for 
judicial independence, because the actors involved would be preoccupied with 
a degraded notion of judicial accountability. At the end of the day, judicial 
independence would become a junior partner to judicial accountability, or the 
partnership would be dissolved. 
The work of these years on judicial independence and accountability, 
practical and theoretical, proved influential when, in 2008, I was asked to 
participate in an interdisciplinary conference on what judges do, why they 
do it, and what’s at stake, and to contribute a chapter to the volume that 
emerged from the conference:37 
 What, then, do I see as the state of current knowledge about judicial 
behavior? The framework I have chosen to describe it is drawn from 
work on judicial independence and accountability . . . . Accountability to 
law is an important source of constraint (or self-restraint) posited by 
those who resist claims that judges are completely independent to decide 
as they wish. A putative dichotomy between independence and 
accountability thus maps well on to a putative dichotomy between 
“judicial politics,” defined for this purpose as the pursuit of a judge’s preferences 
on matters of policy relevant in litigation, and “law,” defined for this purpose as 
known and established (but not necessarily determinate) law.38 
 
34 Burbank, supra note 1, at 915-17. 
35 See id. at 915 (“We know that public support for the Supreme Court as an institution[,] . . . 
what political scientists call ‘diffuse support[,]’ . . . was consequential in the failure of President 
Roosevelt’s court-packing plan.” (citations omitted)). 
36 Id. at 916. 
37 See generally Burbank, On the Study of Judicial Behaviors, supra note 22. 
38 Id. at 46 (citations omitted). 
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Using that framework, I derived a number of lessons from the judicial 
behavior literature. The first of them was that, as with judicial independence 
and accountability,  
it is an error to assert or assume that the relationship between “judicial 
politics” and “law” is or should be the same with respect to every judge 
in a particular judicial system, or indeed that it is or should be the same 
even for judges on the same court in every type of case.39  
The second lesson was that “in describing judicial behavior, it is an error to 
posit a dichotomy between ‘law’ and ‘judicial politics.’ Instead, like judicial 
independence and accountability, ‘law’ and ‘judicial politics’ are different sides 
of the same coin. They are not opposites but rather complements.”40 The third 
lesson was that “as with judicial independence and judicial accountability, the 
quantum and quality, or mix, of ‘law’ and ‘judicial politics’ depends, or should 
depend, on what a particular polity wants from its courts.”41 
And what would a decade in my life with judicial independence and 
accountability be without a bad news moment? Asked to write a paper for a 
conference exploring—but mostly touting—proposals to abolish life tenure for 
Supreme Court justices in favor of one non-renewable eighteen-year term, I 
demurred on the ground that I needed to think more about the proposal and the 
arguments advanced in its favor than the time available before the conference 
would permit. “No problem,” said the organizers, “you can write a paper over 
the summer, and we will include it in the published volume.” Well, after a 
summer spent with the political science literatures on public knowledge of and 
attitudes towards courts and on the behavior of interest groups, I concluded that 
this idea—to which many legal academics had subscribed—was a bad idea and 
explained why in the paper I sent off to the conference organizers. To say that 
they were not pleased would be an understatement. One of them wanted to 
rescind the promise of publication, but he was dissuaded by his colleague.42 
It turns out that most of the justifications offered in favor of the 
proposal did not bear scrutiny.43 Among them was the notion—which only 
a law professor could entertain—that the appointments process is the only 
check on the independence of the justices, or, put otherwise, the only source 
 
39 Id. at 47 (emphasis omitted). 
40 Id. at 51 (emphasis omitted). 
41 Id. at 56-57 (emphasis omitted). 
42 See generally Stephen B. Burbank, An Interdisciplinary Perspective on the Tenure of Supreme 
Court Justices, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 317 
(Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006). For a revised and expanded version of this 
paper, see Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution II: Changing the Tenure of Supreme Court 
Justices, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1511 (2006) [hereinafter Alternative Career Resolution II]. 
43 See Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution II, supra note 42, at 1515-35. 
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of the Court’s accountability. On the contrary, as political scientists have 
long argued and more recently demonstrated empirically, the Court pays 
attention both to Congress and to the public. The justices understand that 
the Court’s legitimacy, and hence its independence, depends critically on 
what the late Richard Arnold called “the continuing consent of the 
governed.”44 And from that perspective, another grave problem with the 
proposal, which when fully operational would entail two Supreme Court 
vacancies during every four-year presidential term, is precisely that it would 
increase the incentives of politicians and interest groups to portray justices 
as policy agents, cementing the worst tendencies of contemporary politics 
by further undermining the rule of law.45 
**** 
Finally, although not directly the subject of my work over the past decade, 
judicial independence and (in particular) judicial accountability remain 
important themes in that work, most of which has involved collaboration with 
the political scientist and law professor Sean Farhang on a project that was 
inspired by his brilliant book, The Litigation State.46 There, Sean interrogated 
the massive increases in the amount of federal litigation involving federal 
statutory and constitutional rights that started in the 1960s.47 Through 
painstaking quantitative and qualitative analysis, he showed that the standard 
Chamber of Commerce story—which attributes the increase to a litigious 
populace, a greedy bar, and an imperial judiciary—is, if not simply wrong, 
then radically incomplete.48 For it neglects the fact that starting in the 1960s, 
Congress increasingly made conscious decisions to include in legislation it 
enacted either pro-plaintiff fee-shifting, enhanced damages provisions, or 
both, in order to stimulate private enforcement.49 
Our project has been to investigate the ways in which the most important 
federal lawmakers in the domain of private enforcement—Congress, those 
responsible for court rulemaking under the Rules Enabling Act, and the Supreme 
Court—have responded to the growth of the Litigation State. In a series of 
 
44 Richard S. Arnold, Judges and the Public, LITIG., Summer 1983, at 5, 5; Stephen B. Burbank, 
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47 See generally id. 
48 See generally id. 
49 See generally id. 
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articles and our recent book,50 we show that, starting in the first Reagan 
administration, the growth of litigation as a central instrument to implement 
social and economic regulation met opposition emanating primarily from the 
rising conservative legal movement and the Republican Party.51 This 
counterrevolution fared very differently in those three lawmaking sites, however. 
In marked contrast to its substantial failure in Congress52 and only modest 
and episodic success in the domain of rulemaking,53 the counterrevolution 
against private enforcement of federal rights achieved growing rates of 
support, especially over the past several decades, from an increasingly 
conservative Supreme Court.54 In cases with at least one dissent, plaintiffs’ 
probability of success when litigating private enforcement issues before the 
Supreme Court has been in decline for over forty years.55 By 2014, plaintiffs 
were losing about 90% of the time, an outcome driven by the votes of 
conservative justices.56 Moreover, the effect of ideology on justices’ votes in 
private enforcement cases has grown significantly larger over time, especially 
since about the mid-1990s, during which time the Court’s private 
enforcement docket has come to focus increasingly on business regulation 
cases and has become associated with increasing advocacy against private 
enforcement by the Chamber of Commerce and conservative law reform 
organizations.57 Remarkably, at the end of the period we studied, justices were 
more ideologically polarized over apparently technical rules of private 
enforcement than they were over the actual substantive rights in statutes.58 
What explains the variation across institutional sites and the Supreme 
Court’s relative success in the counterrevolution to retrench private 
enforcement? Four distinguishing institutional characteristics seem to have 
the greatest explanatory value.59 First, as contrasted with the institutional 
fragmentation of the legislative and rulemaking processes, the Court is 
governed by a more streamlined decisional process and simple voting rules, 
making it comparatively more capable of unilateral action—by simple 
majority vote—on controversial issues.60 Second, in an era of divided 
government and party polarization, the Court has faced less credible threats 
 
50 STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE 
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51 Id. at 25-34. 
52 Id. at 34-64. 
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of statutory override and, correspondingly, has enjoyed a wider range of 
policymaking discretion.61 The growth of the influence of ideology on 
justices’ votes on private enforcement issues after 1994 is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the Court exercised wider policymaking discretion during 
this period, with the conservative majority pushing the law of private 
enforcement more assertively in the anti-enforcement direction, eliciting 
greater opposition from the liberal minority.62 
Third, courts and the judges who sit on them are far more insulated from 
the forces and incentives of democratic politics than elected officials or 
rulemakers, which gives the Supreme Court greater freedom to act decisively 
on divisive issues.63 Legislators and presidents are democratically accountable 
through elections, which limits their ability to retrench existing rights that 
enjoy broad popularity.64 Prominent among the influences that doomed the 
Reagan administration’s legislative retrenchment initiatives was the fear, 
abetted by extensive press coverage, that the public would regard the bills as 
further evidence that the administration was hostile to civil rights and, 
subsequently, punish the bills’ elected sponsors in the 1984 elections.65 
Members of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules are not elected.66 Yet, 
rulemaking under the Enabling Act involves the exercise of delegated 
legislative power.67 Widespread public perception that the members of the 
Advisory Committee, in particular its Article III judge members, were engaged 
in ordinary politics could bring the process into disrepute, putting at risk the 
major source of the federal judiciary’s power to craft rules of procedure.68 
To observe that “courts and the judges who sit on them are far more 
insulated from the forces and incentives of democratic politics than elected 
officials or rulemakers” is not to say that the Supreme Court is immune to 
public opinion.69 As previously observed, the Court’s power in the long run—
its independence—depends on the continued existence of a well of diffuse 
support, the depth of which could be adversely affected by a series of unpopular 
decisions, particularly decisions perceived to deprive people of rights enjoying 
broad support.70 The Court recognizes—or at least some of the justices do—
that public standing and perceived legitimacy are important to its institutional 
power, and it therefore is cautious about straying too far or for too long from 
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public opinion.71 Consequently, the Court’s need for broad public support 
places limits on its ability to scale back highly visible and popular substantive 
rights directly.72 When seeking to retrench enforcement of rights that enjoy 
broad public support, the Court benefits from strategically steering the 
discussion onto apparently technical and legalistic terrain, where the public is 
less likely to learn of the decisions at all.73 Because of their lower public 
visibility, the Court’s decisions on rights enforcement are less constrained by 
public opinion and therefore less tethered to democratic governance.74 
In the first of the articles leading to our book, Professor Farhang and I 
advanced the hypothesis that the strategy of retrenching private enforcement 
of rights, rather than the rights themselves, enables justices who share the 
goals of the counterrevolution to avoid eroding diffuse support for the Court, 
even when the decisions in question do not track public opinion, because the 
public is unlikely to be aware of them.75 Some readers of that article 
challenged the hypothesis by invoking this or that high-profile decision 
retrenching private enforcement, such as Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.76 
Accordingly, we undertook an empirical investigation.77 Recognizing that the 
media are the primary source of the public’s information about Supreme 
Court decisions, we created an original dataset based on content analysis of 
newspaper coverage of Supreme Court decisions affecting private 
enforcement—such as decisions on damages, fees, and class actions—and 
decisions on the associated merits issues. It allowed us to compare the extent 
of coverage of Supreme Court decisions ruling on substantive rights to that 
of decisions ruling on opportunities and incentives to enforce those rights. As 
we expected, Supreme Court decisions on laws relating to the enforcement of 
rights receive dramatically less press coverage than decisions on the rights 
themselves.78 The media’s role in informing the public about the work of the 
Supreme Court declines precipitously when one moves from rulings on rights 
to rulings on their enforcement. Thus, the Court’s relative success in 
retrenching legal rules salient to private enforcement was fostered by the lower 
visibility of its retrenchment efforts as compared to those of Congress or the 
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Advisory Committee. The story of retrenchment of private enforcement by 
court decision is one of substantial change effected in large part by many 
comparatively small acts of lawmaking over decades, few of which garnered 
much public or press attention. As Paul Pierson put it, such slow-moving 
processes of retrenchment may be “invisible at the surface” while producing 
“long-term erosion”—like “termites working on a foundation.”79 
Dependent on the media for information about the Court’s work, most 
members of the public have not been aware that the Court has sapped the 
value of their statutory and constitutional rights by making it more difficult 
to enforce them. The resulting lack of accountability has freed the justices to 
do indirectly what prudent management of the institution’s perceived 
legitimacy would prevent them from doing directly. The Court recognizes that 
its public standing is not hurt by decisions that the public does not learn about. 
The media must recognize, then, that by not covering the Court’s private 
enforcement cases, they are enabling the subterranean counterrevolution. 
This is not the only democratic deficit that our work reveals. A majority of 
the cases in our data involved the interpretation of private enforcement regimes 
in federal statutes, and in 79% of the cases, plaintiffs were asserting federal 
statutory rights.80 One need not subscribe to a naïve or simplistic view of federal 
courts as wholly beyond democratic control or of Congress as resembling a New 
England town meeting in order to believe that judicial subversion of legislation 
raises troubling questions from the standpoint of democratic values. 
To be sure, Congress sometimes intentionally fails to resolve foreseeable 
and controversial issues for strategic reasons, delegating policymaking 
authority to courts. When democratically accountable legislators intentionally 
license courts to resolve issues left unaddressed, regarding the ensuing judicial 
policymaking as undemocratic is mistaken. But this account does not fit the 
Court’s increasingly assertive anti-private enforcement posture. There is no 
legislative license for retrenchment though judicial interpretation. The bulk of 
the laws on which the Litigation State was founded were passed by Democratic 
congresses distrustful of an administrative state under Republican presidential 
leadership. The conservative wing of the Court mounted a campaign against 
private enforcement with the goal of demobilizing those private lawsuits. 
Rather than carrying out an implicit legislative mandate to make policy choices 
that Congress sought to avoid, the conservative wing of the Court is better 
understood as seeking to enfeeble legislative policy with which it disagrees and 
doing so by means that avoid accountability. 
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**** 
Judicial independence and judicial accountability present challenges that 
are fascinating, difficult, and of the utmost importance to our democracy. 
Laws, we are told, are “those wise restraints that make us free.”81 Experience 
over the last two years has reminded us that, in times of aspiring 
authoritarianism in the executive branch and serial subservience in the 
legislative branch, independent and accountable courts are the bulwark of our 
freedoms. Those who lived through Watergate should not need the reminder. 
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